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I. INTRODUCTION

The preparation of an international convention on the law
applicable to trusts and on their recognition was, for the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, a step into a new
analytical area-that of the unknown legal institution.' Topics
such as the adoption of children, or even divorce and legal
separation, had offered some problems of characterization-or
occasionally even the complete absence of the institution in
question-but none had offered such a wholesale absence of a
legal institution as did the trust project in 1982 with its non-trust
countries (for the most part, classified for convenience as "civil
law countries"). The Adoption Convention, completed in 1964,
had offered the problem of characterization, or of definition, as
between "plenary" adoptions and adoptions granted in some
countries that had less than plenary effects. 2 Since countries
that have Islamic law tend to reject, for religious reasons, any
mechanism for child care that involves a change in the parentchild relationship, the model for the work in the sixties on the
Adoption Convention 3 was based mainly on adoption practice in
Europe. For the work on divorce, the gap in legal institutions was
that a minority of the countries participating in the negotiations
did not have provision for divorce in their laws, and others did
not provide for legal separation. This gap was met in the
Convention of June 1, 1970 on the Recognition of Divorces and
Legal Separations 4 by including provisions specifically directed to
the situations of countries that did not have one or the other of

these institutions.5
1.

See Georges A.L. Droz, Regards sur le droit internationalprivud compard:

Cours gdndral de droit internationalprivd, 229 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INT'L LAW 9, 247-49 (1991); Explanatory Report of Alfred E. von
Overbeck, in HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, ACTEs ET DOCUMENTS DE LA
QUINZIEME SESSION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION, Tome II 370, 372
(1985) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION]; see generally,

Emmanuel Gaillard & Donald L. Trautman, Trusts in Non-Trust Countries: Conflict
ofLaws and the Hague Convention on Trusts, 35 AM. J. COMp. L. 307 (1987).
2.
See Apergu General des Problem de l'Adoption International, in
CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE, ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA

DIXIME SESSION, Tome 11 11, 18-21 (Before the 15th Plenary Session, in 1984,
the volumes of the "Proceedings" of each session bore only the French title: Actes
et documents.).
3.
See Projet Adopt6 par la Dixieme Session, in AcrEs ET DOCUMENTS DE LA
DIXIt9ME SESSION at 399-407.

4.
See Extract from the Final Act of the Eleventh Session, in Conference
de la Haye de Droit International Priv6, ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA ONZI9ME
SESSION, Tome II 201, 201-08; Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and
Legal Separations, June 1, 1970, 978 U.N.T.S. 393 (1975).
5.
See Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations,
supranote 4, arts. 7, 19, 20, 21.
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The broad gap between jurisdictions based on English law
(together with those that have adopted by statute either a
comprehensive form of trust, or trusts for use in particular areas
of activity) and those jurisdictions that have never had a fiduciary
mechanism such as the trust (whose legislation may even
preclude the operation of such a mechanism) posed a challenge
that brought about a new style of research at the Hague
Conference. In addition to French, English had only been brought

in as an official and working language of the Hague Conference,
in 1964 when the United States joined during the Conference's
10th Plenary Session. There had only been one member of the
Permanent Bureau with English as his native language and
trained in the common law and equity since 1966. Now, for the
first time, a member from the common law staff and a member
from a civil law, non-trust jurisdiction were assigned to work
together and prepare the report that would begin, and form the
basis for, the initial discussions leading to the adoption of a
treaty dealing with the private international law of trusts. The
result was Preliminary Document No. 1, issued in May 1982 and
entitled Report on Trusts and Analogous Institutions, by Adair
6
Dyer and Hans van Loon.
Fortunately, the work of the Hague Conference on a topic
depends only for its start on the practical experience and
analytical skills of the members of the Permanent Bureau, all of
whom are to a large extent "generalists." Member states come to
the rescue with distinguished specialists, both in private
international law and in the subject area. From the first meeting
of the Special Commission, these experts took over the shaping of
a treaty text, depending on the Secretariat only for essential
support services.
The United States sent Professor Donald
Trautman of Harvard University, who had taught trusts (as well
as conflict of laws alongside Professor Arthur von Mehren),
succeeding to and in consultation with Professor Austin Scott.
Canada sent Professor Donovan Waters, author of the leading
treatise on the Canadian law of trusts7 as well as of a book on
constructive trusts. 8 The United Kingdom sent Professor David
Hayton, the legal scholar continuing the leading treatise,
Underhill and Hayton, Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees,9 and

6.
See Report on Trusts and Analogous Institutions (Preliminary
Document No. 1 of May 1982) in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION, supra
note 1, at 10-110.
7.
See generally D.W.M. WATERS, LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA (2d ed. 1984).
8.
See generally D.W.M. WATERS, THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST: THE CASE FOR
A NEW APPROACH IN ENGLISH LAW (1964).
9.
See generally ARTHUR UNDERHILL, UNDERHILL AND HAYTON, LAW RELATING
TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (15th ed. 1995).
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the leading casebook, Nathan and Mlarshall.l0 The Scottish legal
system was represented at the Special Commission by the other
expert designated on behalf of the United Kingdom, Professor A.E.
Anton, member of the Scottish Law Commission, who
participated in the work of the ad hoc Drafting Committee that
met in November 1982 and drew up the first Draft articles."
The continental European countries, for obvious reasons,
had more difficulty sending experts who were known for their
work in the field of trust law. Switzerland, which had a leading
court decision on the treatment of a trust by a non-trust country,
contributed Professor Alfred E. von Overbeck, a well-known
academic expert on private international law, who was elected
Reporter by the Special Commission. The host country, the
Netherlands, contributed the work and long experience of C.D.
van Boeschoten, a distinguished senior partner of a major law
firm in The Hague, who was elected to serve as Chairman of the
Special Commission. Germany designated Professor Hein K6tz,
who had authored a pioneering comparative work entitled Trust
und Treuhand.12 Italy sent A. Gambaro, Professor of Comparative
Law at the University of Turin. France sent Jean-Paul Bdraudo, a
magistrate then attached to the Ministry of Justice, who authored
3
the book Les trusts anglo-saxons et le droitfrangais.1
For the diplomatic conference, Egypt, which could take an
interested role because of the Islamic legal institution, the waqf
or wakf 14 sent A. Rizk, Vice-Minister of Justice and VicePresident of the Supreme Court, together with Professor Fouad
Riad of Cairo University.
Japan, which had the fiduciary
institution known as Shintaku,1 5 sent its most distinguished.
expert on private international law, Professor Ikehara of Sophia
University and Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo.
Australia sent Professor Michael Pryles to the diplomatic session,
alongside Trevor Bennett of the Attorney General's Department,
who had participated in the Special Commission's work. Cyprus,
which had just joined the Hague Conference, sent Justice A. N.

10.
See generally DAVID J. HAYTON, HAYTON AND MARSHALL:
COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS (9th ed. 1991).

11.

CASES AND

See Draft Articles on the Law Applicable to Trusts and their

Recognition, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION, supra note 1, at 141-43.
The other members of this committee were Messrs. Bdraudo (France) and
Wiesbauer (Austria). See id.
12.
HEIN KOTZ,
TRUST UND TREUHAND;
EINE RECHTSVERGLEICHENOE
DARSTELLUNG DES ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHEN (1963).
13.
JEAN-PAUL BRAUDO, LES TRUSTS ANGLO-SAXONS ET LE DROIT FRANQAIS

(1992).
14.
See Report on Trusts and Analogous Institutions
Document No. 56), supranote 6, at 39.
15.
See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.

(Preliminary
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Loizou of its Supreme Court. Of course, many other experts,
including governmental lawyers and magistrates, participated
actively in the work on trusts and made significant contributions
to the results. It is notable that Panama for the first time sent an
observer to follow the Conference's work.
It is not the purpose of this article to trace the whole history
of the trusts project at The Hague, but I simply wanted to give the
reader some flavor of the treaty-making process at the Hague
Conference, which the Secretary General of the United Nations
once referred to as "highly-structured procedures." 1 6
The
structure comes from the Conference's Statute 17 that, since its
entry into force in 1955, has provided for a diplomatic conference,
in principle, once every four years, and for the first time has
established a permanent intergovernmental organization' s with a
standing Secretariat, committed to the mission of working for the
progressive unification of the rules of private international law.
The four-year cycle imposes discipline both on the Permanent
Bureau and the experts forming the delegations to complete the
preparatory work in time to be able to adopt the final text of
pending conventions at the next Plenary Session. The Trusts
Convention conformed to this pattern and was adopted at the
Hague Conference's 15th Plenary Session in October 1984.19
What were the reasons that led the Hague Conference to
undertake this task, which Professor Waters once described as
the first serious attempt in 600 years to bridge the gap of the
"English" Channel (known in French as La Manche) in the field of
fiduciary law?2 0 Much can be attributed to the impact of the
European Economic Community (EEC), which now has evolved
into the European Union and is presently made up of fifteen
countries. 2 1
The creation of a Common Market among six

16.
George A.L. Droz & Adair Dyer, The Hague Conference and the Main
Issues of PrivateInternationalLaw for the Eighties, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 155, 209

(1981).
17.
Statute of The Hague Conference on Private InternationalLaw, Oct 31,
1951, 220 U.N.T.S. 121 (1955). The statute was drawn up at the Seventh Session
of the Conference held at The Hague from 9-31 October 1951.
18.
The Hague Conference currently has 46 member states.
19.
See Procis-verbal No. 3 (Meeting of Friday, 19 Oct. 1984), in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION, supranote 1, at 359-68. The English text
of the Convention has also been published at 23 I.L.M. 1388 (1984) and 31 NETH.
INT'L L. REV. 447 (1984).

20.
Approximation of a remark heard by the author of this article c. 198284. See Donovan W.M. Waters, The Institution of the Trust in Civil and Common
Law, 252 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT'L LAW 113, 129-30
(1995).
21.
See generally Droz & Dyer, supranote 16, at 208.
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continental European countries 22 starting in 1957 had made it
feasible for businesses from Britain, the United States and
Canada to establish multinational operations in Western Europe
on a much broader scale than had been possible in the past.
This process was accelerated when Great Britain, Ireland, and
Denmark joined the EEC in 1973, and business people came to
be based and domiciled in a country other than that of their
nationality for many years. The reverse process for continental
European business people accelerated with the entry of Great
Britain and Ireland into the EEC. English, Irish, and U.S.
citizens tended nonetheless to do their estate planning in their
traditional way (i.e., by setting up inter vivos trusts or trusts in
their wills), while acquiring property in non-trust countries.
Some of the continental European executives living in England or
the United States learned to like the flexibility of the trust
mechanism and began to use it while still owning or inheriting
property in non-trust countries.
Notaries and, occasionally,
courts in some of the non-trust countries began to be confronted
with the existence of an unknown and unrecognized player in the
context of the settlement of an estate-the trustee.
This growing problem was posed in a limited but important
way in a legal text in 1978. The original six Member States of the
EEC-all non-trust jurisdictions on the continent of Europe-had
drawn up a treaty on jurisdiction and on the recognition and
enforcement of judgments, reciprocal as among them, in 1968.
This treaty is known as the Brussels Convention, 2 3 and it

performs a role among the countries of the European Union
analogous to that which the "full faith and credit clause" of the
U.S. Constitution plays among the fifty states of the union in
regard to mutual respect for the judgments of each other's
courts. 24 The entry of Great Britain and Ireland into the EEC
meant that, for the first time, when these new member states
acceded to the Brussels Convention, litigation involving trusts
and trustees would have to be dealt with in, or excluded from, the
scope of this treaty. The solution adopted in the Accession
Convention of 1978 was to insert a new clause specifying a
special jurisdictional basis for lawsuits involving the internal
22.

France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the three "Benelux"

countries-Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
23.
Original text in French, German, Dutch and Italian.
English
translation may be found at European Communities Convention on Jurisdictionand
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Maters, 8 I.L.M 229 (1969). A
consolidated and updated version, following the 1989 accession of Spain and
Portugal, appears at 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990). The so-called "Lugano Convention,"
designed to extend the system of the Brussels Convention to Member States of the
European Free Trade Area (EFTA), appears at 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989).
24.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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relationships created by a trust (actions against trustees,
beneficiaries or settlors), as well as to amend the clause on choice
of forum (described by the Scottish legal term "prorogation"25 ) in
order to provide the possibility for the settlor to choose an
exclusive forum for internal litigation 2 6 involving the trust
relationships in the trust instrument itself.
The Brussels Convention, as amended by the Accession
Convention of 1978,27 still included its general basis for
jurisdiction over lawsuits, which is the domicile of the defendant
(or any defendant in case they are alleged to be jointly and
severally liable), but now added a special "connecting factor" for
jurisdiction over litigation concerning any of the internal
relationships among settlor-trustee and beneficiary.
This
special jurisdiction was said to exist, in the absence of an
exclusive choice for another forum by the settlor in the trust
instrument, at the "domicile" of the trust. "Domicile" was a word
that, before 1978, was apparently used with reference to a trust
only in the law of Scotland. 28 The use of this undefined term in

Article 5 of the Brussels Convention, as amended by the
Accession Convention of 1978, posed definitional problems for all
participating jurisdictions except Scotland. 29 For the seven EEC
member states (out of nine total members at that time) that did
not have trusts in their law, there was no concept or practical
experience from which to start an interpretative process, much
less principles or rules of private international law3 0 from which
the "domicile" of a trust might be deduced.
This evident lack of the tools with which jurisdiction over
lawsuits concerning trust relationships might be determined,
together with the growing practical need for guidance as to what
law governs a trust that has property both in trusts and nontrust jurisdictions, led the Hague Conference to include the topic
of the law applicable to trusts, as the project with priority in the

25.
See A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 706 (2d ed. 1995).
26.
See A.E. ANTON, CIVIL JURISDICTION IN SCOTLAND § 7.27 at 116-17 (1984).
27.
See Convention on Jurisdictionand the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 18 I.L.M. 21 (1979).
28.
See ANTON, supra note 26, § 5.52 at 83 (citing the Schlosser Report at
106-07).
29.
In the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, which implemented
the Brussels Convention, as amended, in the United Kingdom, the following
definition was set out in § 45(3): "A trust is domiciled in a part of the United
Kingdom if and only if the system of law of that part is the system of law with
which the trust has its closest and most real connection." Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982 § 45(3), 22 I.L.M. 123 (Jan. 1983).
30.
"In order to determine whether a trust is domiciled in the Contracting
State whose courts are seised of the matter, the court shall apply its rules of

private international law." 18 I.L.M. 21, art. 53 para. 2 at 32 (1979).

996

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:989

agenda for its 15th Plenary Session. 3 ' The "highly-structured
procedures" 3 2 started with the issuance of the report in May
1982.33 Almost seventeen years later, all or substantial parts of
the territories of seven countries are covered by the Convention's
rules and principles 34-as well as a significant number of offshore
jurisdictions.3 5
Two large countries, France and the United
States, one not having trusts and the other having them, signed
the Hague Convention and then hesitated, for very different
reasons.36

The

evolution of the practice,

especially in offshore

jurisdictions, is driven by changes in political, social, and
economic conditions of the world.
Yet, the English trust
mechanism retains its basic simplicity and flexibility in the midst
of complex motivations and applications.
In many respects,
stemming from the historical-political accident of the creation of
special courts of chancery or equity alongside the common law
courts in medieval England, it has become the keystone of a legal
system that, through the meanderings of colonial expansion, has
spread to all comers of the globe. The principles of equity and
the trust device have become rooted in legal systems that, as is
the case in Texas, have never had separate chancery courts. The
Hague Convention was intended to contribute some multinational
bridging and mutual understanding to this long flow of the
history of trust and equitable fiduciary principles. It was not

31.
See Final Act of the Fourteenth Session, in HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZI9ME SESSION, Tome
I 1-28, 1-64, § E(3) (stating the Fourteenth Session's decision "to include with
priority in the Agenda of work of the Fifteenth Session the question of
international validity and recognition of trusts.").
32.
Droz & Dyer, supranote 16.
33.
See Adair Dyer & Hans van Loon, Report on Trusts and Analogous
Institutions, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION, supranote 1, at 10-110.
34.
Australia, Canada (Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New
Brunswick, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan only), China
(Hong Kong Special Administrative Region only), Italy, Malta, the Netherlands (the
Kingdom in Europe), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the United States. See Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to
Trusts
and
Their
Recognition
(last
updated
Nov.
18,
1998)
<http://wvv.hcch.net/e/status/stat30e.html>.
The Conference's internet
homepage gives the current status of signatures, ratifications and accessions,
together with reservations and declarations. See id.
35.
Isle of Man, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Virgin
Islands, Falkland Islands (coverage contested by Argentina under name of Islas
Malvinas), Gibraltar, Saint Helena, Saint Helena Dependencies, South Georgia
and the South Sandwich Islands, United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas of
Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the Island of Cyprus, Montserrat, the Bailiwick of Jersey,
the Island of Guernsey (but not the Islands of Alderney and Sark), and the Turks
&Caicos. See id.
36.
See id.; see also discussion infra Part III.
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intended to solve all problems, or meet all possible variations in
the trust practice. Most especially, it was not intended to control
the practices of the tax authorities in the different countries,
although its analytical framework may have some influence in the
direction of rationalization of such practices in non-trust
countries.
Finally, the question of the ratification of or accession to the
Hague Trusts Convention by a non-trust country is independent
of the question of whether such a country should itself adopt a
form of trust in its domestic law.
The answer to the latter question depends on assessments of
the degree to which existing fiduciary practices in that country
fulfill the needs of its current-day and future economic and social
systems and, conversely, the extent to which introduction of a
trust-like device might disrupt the functioning of that system.
The answer to the first question relates mainly to the smooth
functioning of transnational economic and social activity, and an
assessment of the extent to which improvements brought to such
functioning by adherence to the Hague Convention's rules and
principles might outweigh any inconveniences to the application
of domestic law that might result from the Convention's
application. Those inconveniences are, of course, much smaller
in scope and weight for a jurisdiction that has English-style
trusts in its law and equity principles applied regularly by its
courts. Implementation of the Hague Convention in a non-trust
country may require careful consideration in advance of the
issues that will be raised in domestic law, but the benefits of
adherence to a transnational framework of cooperation may be
well worth the effort required.

II. THE RECOGNITION OF MULTINATIONAL TRUSTS
UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION

A. The Scope of the Hague Convention
The Hague Conference on Private International Law has as
its statutory mission "to work for the progressive unification of
the rules of private international law."3 7 Private international
law, in the traditional European sense, includes the conflict of
laws, conflicts of jurisdiction (both the principles governing
assumption of jurisdiction in cases involving transnational

37.
Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Oct. 31,
1951, 220 U.N.T.S. 121.
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elements, and those governing the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments), international judicial cooperation, and, under
some views, the status of aliens.3 8 While a treaty unifying
substantive law in a particular field might possibly be viewed as
an instrument falling within the scope of private international
law,3 9 the preparation of such treaties has not been considered to
be a part of the Hague Conference's mission. The Conference has
only occasionally included a particular unifying substantive
provision in one of its treaties as a matter of perceived necessity
in dealing with the private international law issues of a specific
area. The unification of substantive law on a global basis has
otherwise been left to the Conference's sister institution in Rome,
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT)4 0 and, more recently, in the commercial area to the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL).41

Thus, the unification of fiduciary law as among countriesfor example, by the creation of a generalized trust concept
allowing civil law countries to align their law with that of the
common law countries-would not fall within the Hague
Conference's mission. In fact, UNIDROIT in the 1950s undertook
research with a view to determining whether such a project would
be feasible within its mission,4 2 but it concluded in 1959 that
further study should be limited to "the application, in the
continental legal systems, of some general principles deriving
more or less directly from the peculiar and distinctive aspect of

trust in the field of the management of investments in stocks and
shares, according to the various specifications of the well-known
investment trusts."4
The Hague Convention, therefore, is in essence an effort to
unify the international rules of conflict of laws for trusts. If there
is anything in it that might be viewed as touching on the
38.

See Droz & Dyer, supranote 16, at 155-56.
See id. at 156 (citing F. MAJOROS, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV8 10-12
(2d ed. 1981)).

39.

40.
41.

22 U.S.C. § 269g (1990).
See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
42.
See Geoffrey Hornsey, Report on Possible Uses of Certain Principles of
the Trust in Civil Law Countries (I), INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW
[hereinafter UNIDROIT] 1957 Y.B. 44; Ludovico Mattew Bentivoglio, Investment
Trusts (V, UNIDROIT 1957 Y.B. 44, 105; Mario Matteucci, The Activities of the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT 1959 Y.B. 24,
41.
43.
Adair Dyer, Introductory Note on the Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to Trusts and Their Recognition, 1 UNIFORM L. REV. 274, 276 (1985)
(citing and quoting UNIDROIT 1960 Y.B. at 39); cf. Dyer & van Loon, supra note

33, at 35, n. 52.
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unification of substantive fiduciary law, it is to be found among
the minimum elements of the "recognition" of a trust as set out in
Article 11. However, the effects of this provision are attenuated
(to the extent necessary in order to protect the operation of the
mandatory rules of the law designated by the conflicts rules of
the forum to govern certain non-trust questions) by the categories
laid down in Article 15 and the thrust of the second paragraph of
Article 15.
B. The Hague Trusts Convention in the Crucible of
Varying Concepts of Property Law
An effort towards unifying the substantive principles of
fiduciary law within Europe has recently been made by a group of
distinguished experts that, in 1996, formed the International
Working Group on European Trust Law. This body, operating
under the auspices of the Business and Law Research Center of
the University of Nijmegen (The Netherlands), in January 1999
44
issued a book entitled Principles of European Trust Law,
general commentary and certain national
including a
commentaries-the first volume of a series entitled Law of
Business and Finance. This effort is to be commended, and the
results show how far the intra-European discussions in this area
of law have progressed 4 s since the pioneering inquiries of
UNIDROIT in the 1950s. The developments have been fueled by
the overall unification efforts of the EEC and the European
Union, 46 but I would suggest that the Hague Conference's work in
the 1980s on the law applicable to trusts and their recognition
moved the ball significantly forward and broadened the

discussions to include Canada, Japan, the United

States,

Australia, a number of Latin American countries, as well as
ultimately China (including the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region).
The Permanent Bureau's original research had identified the
divergent concepts of ownership as a primary stumbling block for

44.
BUSINESS AND LAW RESEARCH CENTER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NIJMEGEN,
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TRUST LAW (David J. Hayton et al. eds., Kluwer Law
International, forthcoming 1999). A copy of this work was presented to Hans van
Loon, Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, on
January 15, 1999, during a seminar held at the Peace Palace. See The Hague
Conference Homepage, 1999 News & Events (last visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.hcch.net/e/events/events.html>.
45.
Because it only recently came to hand, very little account could be
taken of this book's valuable contents in this article.
46.
Note here the specific impact of the Accession Convention of 1978
modifying the Brussels Convention. See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
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work on a trusts and trust-like devices international treaty. 4 7
Commentators, both from civil law countries and from common
law jurisdictions, had referred to "dual ownership" as a
characteristic of the trust mechanism-the "legal ownership" 4of8
the trustee and the "equitable ownership" of the beneficiary.
While this distinction might have some practical illustrative
value, it tended simply to paper over and obscure the different
ideas of ownership. 4 9 Moreover, the fundamental function of the
trust mechanism seemed to consist of a separation between the
control of the assets making up a trust fund and the right to the
economic benefits ultimately deriving from such assets. In this
context, the idea of a division of ownership seemed irrelevant,
and even dangerous, since some civil law systems had a
comprehensive definition of "ownership" as an absolute concept
while in some common law systems this was not a term of legal
art. In common law systems, litigation concerning property tends
to reduce itself to questions of who has the better title or who is
entitled to a particular interest in the asset, as interests are
capable of being subdivided in time and space.
Trust
instruments frequently create future and contingent interests in
ways that may contradict basic concepts of ownership in nontrust countries.
These considerations caused the Hague Conference, in the
course of its work to adopt a definition of a "trust" in Article 2 of
the Convention that (1) is not comprehensive in nature, (2) refers
to legal relationships rather than to any obligations of the trustee,
and (3) is keyed to the control of assets by the trustee rather than
to any idea of ownership. The resulting text has been referred to
as a "gateway"5 0 definition: an image that caters to the need for
judges and lawyers in non-trust countries to be able to identify
trust-like devices operationally from their specific characteristics,
rather than having to view them as a whole and try to fit them
within a comprehensive defimition.5 1
It is notable that Article I of the Principlesof European Trust
Law,5 2 entitled "Main characteristics of the trust," also
constitutes something of a "gateway" definition rather than a
comprehensive definition. This is in line with the approach of the
Hague Conference, as indeed is most of the text of the Principles.

47.
See Dyer & van Loon, supranote 33, at 15-17.
48.
See id. at 17.
49.
See id. at 17, 35.
50.
See Waters, supranote 20, at 130, 437-48.
51.
See Explanatory Report by Alfred E. von Overbeck, supra note 1, no.
36, at 378 ("Article 2 simply tries to indicate the characteristics" that an
institution must have to be covered by the Convention).
52.
See supranote 44.
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Perhaps the most significant difference is in paragraph (1) of
This
Article I, which states that the trustee owns assets.
difference may be attributable to the divergent purposes of the
two texts-the Convention and the Principles. The Principles
seem to be directed towards the unification of substantive law
while the Convention is an operational instrument intended to
bridge the gap between differing systems of fiduciary and
property law. Moreover, the Principles use the verb "to own" only
with reference to the trustee, employing the expressions "personal
rights" and "proprietary rights" in regard to the beneficiary.
Thus, the concept of dual ownership, which is misleading at the
level of comparative law because of the differing ideas as to what
constitutes ownership and because ownership is a term of legal
53
art in some systems but not in others, has been avoided.

The point may be illustrated by quoting part of the definition
of ownership in A Dictionaryof Modem Legal Usage:
The word ownership is subject to nearly the same doubleness of
meaning as property (q.v.): While it is usual to speak of ownership
of land, what one owns properly is not the land, but rather the
rights of possession and approximately unlimited use, present or
future. In other words, one owns not the land, but rather an estate
in the land. This is, in some degree, true of any material thing.
One owns not the thing, but the right of possession and enjoyment
54
of the thing.

The same dictionary defines a trust in four senses:
(1) the confidence reposed in a person who looks after property for
another's use or benefit; (2) an equitable estate committed to the
charge of a fiduciary (trustee) for a beneficiary; (3) the relationship
between the holder of the property and the property so held; or (4)
a combination that aims at a monopoly. 5s

What is interesting about these four senses of the term and the
more elaborate gateway definitions employed in the Convention
and the Principles is that only one of them, sense (4), suggests
the existence of any legal entity arising from the relationships or

53.
This point was elaborated upon in the initial report by Dyer and van
Loon. See Dyer & van Loon, supra note 33, at 15-17. In a preadvies (report)
offered to the Netherlands Branch of the International Law Association in June

1983, this author referred to the idea of dual ownership as being a "red herring"
in the context of preparation of an international treaty. This comment gave rise to
a discussion at the annual meeting of that organization held in Delft on June 18,
1983, as reported in VERSLAG VAN DE ALGEMENE LEDENVERGADERING, Juni 1983, No.
88, Mei 1984 at 28-30. The author quoted DONOVAN W.M. WATERS, THE LAW OF
TRUsTs IN CANADA, 11-12 (1974).
54.
A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 633 (2d ed. 1995) (quoting 1
HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2, at 4 (Basil Jones ed., 3d ed.
1939)).
55.
Id. at 892.
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the separate trust fund. Sense (4) stemmed from the employment
of the trust device for the purpose of creating monopolistic
holding companies in the United States in the latter part of the
19th century. This practice stimulated the adoption of the socalled "antitrust" laws, but ceased very quickly when it became
possible under the laws of certain states for one corporation to
hold shares of others. One of the educational tasks of the Hague
Conference's work was to explain that, in the 20th century,
antitrust law had nothing to do with trusts.5 6 Another task was
to make it clear, despite much loose usage of the word "trust,"
that a trust in the technical sense is not a legal entity.
Now, it is not for me in this article to express an opinion as
to whether any legal relationship known to Italian law would fall
within the confines of the definition in the Hague Convention.
This is a point that Professor Maurizio Lupoi may wish to
57
address.
The failure of Article 2 of the Convention to require that the
trustee own the assets in the trust fund is counterbalanced by
the statement therein of the legal conclusion or characteristic
that "the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of
the trustee's own estate."5 8
Moreover, another stated
characteristic is that "title to the trust assets stands in the name
of the trustee or in the name of another person on behalf of the
trustee."5 9 The latter hypothesis means, in my opinion, that
shares of an incorporated company held and traded by the
trustee through a broker in street name still form part of the
separate trust fund within the meaning of the Convention.
Presumably, the Principles would reach the same result through
interpretation of the verb "owns" in Article I, paragraph (1).
However, the relationship between the trustee and the broker is
an agency relationship rather than a trust relationship. Modem
applications of the trust mechanism frequently call for trustees,
as a matter of economic efficiency, to carry out many or even
most of their operations through the intermediary services of
agents.
The proposal in France to create a trust-like device for
certain purposes-to be known as the fiducie-posed the question
of whether the device in question, characterized as a contract,
could fall within the Hague Convention's definition and thus be
entitled to recognition abroad. As will be discussed below, I
believe that the contract in question was not a trust, but that the

56.
See Dyer & van Loon, supranote 33, at 21-23.
57.
See Maurizo Lupoi, The Civ Law Trust4 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 967,
987 (1999).
58.
See Proceedings of the Fifteen Session, supranote 1, art. 2(a).
59.
See id., art. 2(b).
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contract would have given rise to legal relationships that would
have been in the nature of a trust as envisaged in the Hague
Convention. Regrettably, the proposal fell victim to opposition by
the French fiscal authorities, 6 0 and the project to ratify the Hague
Convention went to the back-burner-a result that did not
necessarily follow from the failure to adopt a trust-like device in
domestic law.
In the Netherlands, it was clear that no existing legal
mechanism of Dutch law would qualify as a trust within the
meaning of the Convention.
This type of division of the
ownership of property was forbidden by Article 84 of Book 3 of
the Civil Code, which sets the requirements for a valid transfer of
an asset and declares that a transaction that has the purpose of
transferring an asset for security does not have the effect of
transferring valid title to the asset. This rule was so fundamental
6
to protecting the comprehensive definition of ownership '
(eigendom)in Dutch law that legislators were unwilling to change
it at the domestic level. Proposals to change the Dutch bewind so
as to extend it and bring it within the Trusts Convention were
62
officially withdrawn.
Article 4 of the Dutch Law on Conflicts Rules for Trusts
(WCT), however, sets aside the constraints of Article 84 in the

60.
See Waters, supranote 20, at 391-96; cf. Ph. R~my, National Reportfor
France,PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TRUST LAW, supranote 44, at 131-32.
61.

NEW NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE: PATRIMONIAL LAW (PROPERTY, OBLIGATIONS

AND SPECIAL CONTRACTS) arts. 1-3, book 5, tit. 1 (Peter Haanappel & Ejan Mackaay
trans., Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1990).
Art. 1
1.
Ownership is the most comprehensive right which a person can have
in a thing.

2.

To the exclusion of everybody else, the owner is free to use the thing

provided that this use not be in violation of the rights of others and that it
respects the limitations based upon statutory rules and rules of unwritten
law.

3. Without prejudice to the rights of others, the owner of the thing
becomes owner of the fruits once separated.
Art. 2
The owner of a thing is entitled to revendicate it from any person who
detains it without right.
Art. 3
To the extent that the law does not provide otherwise, the owner of a thing
is owner of all its component parts.
Id.
62.

See M.E. KOPPENOL-LAFORCE, HET HAAGSE TRUSTVERDRAG (The Hague

Trusts Convention) (Kluwer-Law and Taxation Publishers 1997) 270 (English
summary); cf. KORTMANN & VERHAGEN, National Report for the Netherlands,
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TRUST LAW, supra note 44, at 203-05.
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context of the recognition of a trust under Article 11 of the
Convention, and leaves the recognition of a trust unhindered by
the provisions of Dutch law protecting creditors in case of
insolvency. Dr. M.E. Koppenol-Laforce raises the question, in
Chapter 5 of her dissertation, "whether the Trusts Convention
together with art. 4 WCT... introduces some sort of trust in the
Netherlands."6 3 She concludes that it is possible to create a trust
with respect to property situated in the Netherlands.
I think that Dr. Koppenol-Laforce's position on this point is

correct-to the extent that the provisions of the Convention's
Article 11, reinforced in domestic law by Article 4 of the WCT,
result in a substantive unification of law as to certain aspects of a
trust, overriding several escape clauses set out in the
Convention's Article 15. Dr. Koppenol-Laforce herself, however,
opines that Article 4 of the WCT "does not have the intention to
set aside Dutch rules on transfer and mingling if it concerns a
trust."64 The "Netherlands trust" created by recognition under
the Convention, therefore, does not have all of the attributes of
the trust created under a foreign law; it has only those attributes
flowing from the application of the Convention's Article 11 and
Article 4 of the WCT.
C. What Does "Recognition"of a Trust Mean?
The Netherlands delegations to the Special Commission and
to the Conference's 15th Plenary Session opposed the inclusion
in the Convention of provisions dealing with the "recognition" of a
trust, on the grounds that uniform provisions on the law
applicable to a trust would be sufficient or, at most, specification
of "the effects of' recognition would suffice. 65 The Netherlands'
implementing legislation (the WCT) has nonetheless keyed on
Article 11-the first article in the Recognition chapter-in order to
set not only the minimum limits up to which the foreign
applicable law will be applied, but also, by inference, the areas in
which Dutch mandatory rules may prevail. The main advance in
the field of property law arising from ratification of the treaty is
that the assets transferred to the trustee will constitute a
separate fund, even in the face of restraints upon transfers for

63.
64.
65.

KOPPENOL-LAFORCE, supranote 62, at 270.

Id. at 271.
See Comments of the Governments and International Organizations, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION, supra note 1, at 145 (Preliminary
observations of the Netherlands delegation); Working Document No. 27, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION, supra, at 234 (Proposal of the Netherlands
delegation); Proc~s-verbal No. 7 in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION, supra,
at 279-80,
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the purpose of creating security interests or provisions protecting
creditors in case of insolvency.
The WCT is short and to the point. It concentrates on the
central issue for non-trust countries-the extent to which effect
will be given to a foreign trust that is recognized under Article 11
of the Convention, and the extent to which the provisions of
Article 15 will attenuate the effects of such recognition. it
constitutes a thoughtful, yet relatively simple approach to these
questions, and it is to be hoped that this legislation will bring
about the desired effects at the transnational level while effecting
only minimal intrusions into domestic law.
"Recognition" of a trust within a non-trust jurisdiction,
therefore, will include in most instances a measure of adaptation.
However, attribution of the status of a separate fund for many
types of property-especially immovable property-will not be
enough, because registers of ownership in many non-trust
countries offer no possibility for registration of ownership by a
trustee in that capacity. This capacity is unknown in the legal
systems of those countries. Thus, Article 12 in the "Recognition"
chapter of the Hague Convention entitles a trustee to register
assets "in his capacity as trustee or in such other way that the
existence of the trust is disclosed, in so far as this is not
prohibited by or inconsistent with the law of the State where
By ratifying or acceding to the
registration is sought."6 6
states agree to recognize a
law
contracting
civil
the
Convention,
and bring into
to them
unknown
new legal category previously
67
play a specific new legal person-the trustee.
Article 12 of the Convention has been fully and faithfully
implemented by the Netherlands in Article 3 of the WCT, so that
there is no prohibition of, or inconsistency with, the forms of
registration envisaged. There have as yet been no difficulties with
the application of these registration provisions. A trustee may be
registered as the owner of assets "in his capacity as trustee or in
such other way that the existence of the trust is disclosed." 68 The
application of this provision is not limited to public registers but
having a public function such as
also extends to private registers
69
register.
a shareholders'

Report of the Special Commission by Alfred E. von Overbeck, in
66.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION, supranote 1, art. 12, at 192.
See Droz, supranote 1, at 248.
67.

68.
69.

Id.
See Explanatory Report by Alfred E. von Overbeck, supra note 1, at

396. Article 3 of the WCT seems to envisage this type of register, since it applies
to entries which can be made in een ingevolge de wet gehouden register (in a
register maintained in accordance with the law) (The English translation of this
phrase has been made by the author of this article.).
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A trustee is not required by the Convention to disclose the
capacity in which she acts or the existence of the trust, but may
do so officially if the law applicable to the trust, or its rules on
commingling of assets, require her to do so or make such
disclosure advisable.
D. What Advantages Can Be Derivedfrom Recognition?
Six basic situations can be envisaged, as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)
(6)

Trust created in a common law jurisdiction is to
be recognized in a common law jurisdiction of
another country.
Trust created in a common law jurisdiction is to
be recognized in a non-trust country.
Trust created in a common law jurisdiction is to
be recognized in a jurisdiction in another
country, which jurisdiction has adopted a form
of trust by statute.
Trust created in a jurisdiction that has adopted
a form of trust by statute is to be recognized in a
common law jurisdiction of another country.
Trust created in a jurisdiction that has adopted
a form of trust by statute is to be recognized in a
non-trust country.
Trust created in a jurisdiction that has adopted
a form of trust by statute is to be recognized in a
jurisdiction
of
another
country,
which
jurisdiction has adopted a form of trust by
statute.

Situation 1 (e.g., British Columbia and England) offers no
particular advantage since a common law jurisdiction should
have no difficulty recognizing foreign trust relationships and
giving them the traditional effects, without the need for an
international treaty. The provisions of the Trusts Convention
dealing with the applicable law, however, may be useful for
guidance, especially the provision recognizing the settlor's power
to select the applicable law (Article 6) and allowing a severable
aspect of the trust to be governed by a different law (Article 9).
The settlor's choice of the applicable law, under Article 6, "must
be express or be implied in the terms of the instrument creating
or the writing evidencing the trust, interpreted, if necessary, in
the light of the circumstances of the case." 70 In practice, the
scope of Article 7 may be rather limited since Article 6 offers

70.

Id. at 384.
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broad possibilities for finding an implied choice where no express
choice has been made.
Professor Jeffrey A. Schoenblum has pointed out that "even
common law jurisdictions could refuse to enforce a trust on
public policy grounds," citing the decision of the Nebraska
Supreme Court in First National Bank v. Daggett.7 1 Thus, even
without the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 16 and
Article 18 of the Hague Trusts Convention, a court in a common
law jurisdiction can invoke public policy in the face of a choice of
law by the settlor, in order to protect its mandatory rule applying
the law of the situs to govern trust validity with regard to
immovables. 72 The inclusion in the Convention of these two
provisions, which were primarily intended to allay the fears of
civil law jurisdictions confronting the unknown legal
configuration known as the trust, should also go far towards
meeting the concerns of those title examiners who think that the
Hague Trusts Convention would completely eliminate the situs
rule-even in states where this is considered to be a mandatory
73
rule or a matter of public policy.
Situation 2 (e.g., Australia and the Netherlands) offers the
classic advantages that were sought in drawing up the treaty: the
acceptance of the essential effects of the trust in countries which
do not have this category in their laws. Thus, the position of the
trustee is to be recognized, and property in such a country that
forms part of a foreign trust will be dealt with as a coherent part
of the trust fund, in so far as this does not clash with the local
mandatory
rules.
Obviously,
implementing
the
treaty
thoughtfully, as has been done in the Netherlands, will help to
avoid such clashes.
Situation 3 (e.g., Alberta and Louisiana) is trickier. The
jurisdiction asked to recognize the trust does not work from a
blank slate. It has achieved adoption of a statutory form of trust
without the benefit of having chancery courts or the general
principles of English equity practice to offer a well-tested
background.
Nonetheless, the thoughtful effort of analysis
required in order to implement the Hague Trusts Convention
should offer benefits in bringing its own practice closer to
multinational standards. The recognizing country may need to

71.
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, The Hague Convention on Trusts: Much Ado
About Very Little, 3 J. INTL TR. & CORP. PLAN. 5, 7 n.19 (1994) (citing First Nat'l
Bank v. Daggett, 242 Neb. 734, 497 N.W.2d 358 (1993)).
72.
See id. at 10 n.37 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws, § 278 (1971)).
73.
But see id. at 11 (in Professor Schoenblum's opinion Article 7 would
"totally destabilize American choice of law," and regarding recognition of trusts,
"matters are left extremely murky"); cf. discussion infra Part II.E.
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resort to some of the provisions of the Convention's Article 15 in
dealing with a common law trust since its own statutory version
of the trust may have been better adapted to the specific needs of
its legal system than is the traditional trust developed within
common law jurisdictions and supported by the general
principles of equity practice in those jurisdictions.
Situation 4 (e.g., Quebec and Texas) offers what may become
an unexpected benefit. Common law jurisdictions may find the
various statutory versions of the trust to be strange and difficult
to comprehend. The effort at analysis generated by the process of
treaty implementation may bring into existence materials that will
aid in comprehension and, thus, lead to more faithful application
of the statutory trust principles at the transnational level.
Situation 5 (e.g., Japan and Italy) offers the same potential
advantages as Situation 2 along with the analytical advantages of
Situation 4. If Professor Lupoi is correct in thinking that Italy
has trusts-like devices that fall within the Convention's
definition, 74 then the Japan/Italy relationship would come under
Situation 6.
Situation 6 (e.g., Louisiana and Quebec) would seem to offer
few cases in practice. However, again, the analytical effort may
bring unexpected benefits.
All of these situations reflect the spread of trusts and trustlike devices across the globe-both following and promoting the
globalization of business activities and wealth transfers. The
advantages of joining in these flows of wealth are considerable.
The detriments for a jurisdiction that tries to keep its property
system isolated from the broad transnational developments in

this field may outweigh

the inconveniences

of trying to

understand the varying forms of trusts and trust-like devices and'
reconcile these with each other and analogous methods of
meeting fiduciary needs.
E. What are the PrincipalDisadvantagesof
the Obligation to Recognize?
For jurisdictions that do not have trusts in their law, the
disadvantages relate to the difficulty for the local legal system of
implementing the essential features of the trust institution. Since
there is no domestic trust law, the domain of the applicable
foreign law and the scope given to recognition will be coextensive.
Thoughtful implementation, ds in the Netherlands, will minimize
the intrusions of this foreign legal institution into the domestic
legal system.

74.

See Lupoi, supra note 57, § I (Outline), § 4 (Trusts in Italy).
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For common law jurisdictions, recognition of a trust from a
common law jurisdiction abroad will normally be a simple task.
The foreign law to be applied will have many familiar features,
and the rules for finding the objectively applicable law (Article 7)
are flexible. In the case of the "subjectively applicable law,"
where the settlor has made an express choice (Article 6), the
matters set out in Article 8 will be governed by that law. These
matters are the validity of the trust, its construction, its effects,
and its administration.
A number of the elements of
administration, including "the variation or termination of the
trust," are mentioned specifically by way of illustration.
The important point is, however, that the Convention deals
only with trust law. Article 4 states, "The Convention does not
apply to preliminary issues relating to the validity of wills or of
other acts by virtue of which assets are transferred to the
75
trustee."
Thus, assets are only covered by the Convention after they
have been validly included in the trust fund, by a will that is valid
under the law applicable to it or by an inter vivos transfer such as
an assignment or a deed. The negotiators employed the image of
the 'rocket and the launcher,"7 6 -the trust being the rocket that
only goes into orbit if the launcher, the transfer instrument, has
duly fired off and released it. Thus, the scope of a foreign law
that might be chosen by a settlor, or determined to be applicable
under the criteria of Article 7, does not go to the question of
whether the will, deed or assignment executed by the settlor has
the effect of transferring the assets covered by it to the trustee, or
whether the transfer can be set aside because of fraud.
Concerns expressed in some jurisdictions, which traditionally
apply domestic law to all aspects of the title to land located in the
jurisdiction, about the possible inconveniences arising from the
application of foreign law, have some measure of validity. The

subject needs to be studied further. However, the fact that the
law applicable to a trust under the Convention, chosen by the
settlor or determined objectively, only applies to trust questions,
may reduce the scope of any possible inconvenience. If the
assignment of assets to a trustee, or a will purporting to create a
trust, is invalid under the law of the situs, including its conflict of
laws rules, then the foreign trust will never come into existence in

75.
Extract from the Final Act of the Fifteenth Session, art. 4, in Tome II of
the PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION, supra note 1, at 362 (including the
text of the Final Act as adopted by the Convention). See also supranote 19.
76.
This image is recounted in the Report of the Special Commission by
Alfred E. von Overbeck, in Tome II of the PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION,
supra note 1, at 178 (no. 30) and the Explanatory Report by Alfred E. von
Overbeck, id. at 381 (No. 53).
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respect of those assets. It seems rather unlikely that a transfer of
real property to a trustee that is valid at the situs of the real
property will be voided because the foreign law applicable to the
trust would invalidate the particular trust. Public policy of the
situs might even take over under Article 18 of the Hague Trusts
Convention in order to validate the trust under local law. 77
Formal requirements of the law of the situs relating to the
registration of title or the recording of instruments affecting the
title would continue to apply, as would the procedural rules for
foreclosure under a deed of trust or a trust indenture. Moreover,
by applying Article 18 or the first paragraph of Article 16 of the
Hague Trusts Convention, a court could retain the situs rule in
78
the face of a choice of foreign law to govern the trust.
It is conceivable that any difficulties involved in resolving
questions of validity or internal questions that arise under a trust
governed by a foreign law might be mitigated if all jurisdictions
that are covered by the Hague Trusts Convention were to be
bound by an international treaty, such as the Brussels
Cpnvention, 7 9 providing for special jurisdiction over internal
questions involving relationships between trustees and
beneficiaries and providing for exclusive jurisdiction over such
questions at the place specified by the settlor in the trust
instrument. The work currently going on at The Hague--directed
towards the preparation of a worldwide convention on jurisdiction
and recognition and enforcement of judgments-envisages the
inclusion of a clause giving exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of:
(1)
(2)

the state designated expressly for this purpose
in terms of the trust instrument; or
if none is designated, the state in which is

situated the principal place of administration of
the trust in question; or
(3) if such a place cannot be determined, the state
in which is situated the place with which the
trust has the closest and most substantial
80
connection.

In ascertaining "the place with which the trust has its closest
and most substantial connection," weight would be given in

particular to:
(1)

the place or
administered;

places

where

the

77.
78.
79.

See supranotes 71-73 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supranote 23.

80.

See infra note 81; but see infranote 82.
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the places of residence or business of the
trustees;
the place or places where the purposes of the
trust are to be fulfilled. 8 '

This text has not yet been adopted, or even discussed in
detail, by the Special Commission working on this project at The
Hague, 8 2 and thus it is far from being in final form. The criteria
discussing the place of the closest and most substantial
connection, in the absence of a choice of forum or an identifiable
"principal place of administration," overlap to a very large extent
with the criteria mentioned in Article 7 of the Hague Trusts
Convention in regarding applicable law, as well as with those
mentioned in the U.K.'s legislation implementing the Brussels
Convention in connection with determining the "domicile" of a
trust.
F. Public Policy and MandatoryRules of the Forum
Article 18 of the Hague Trusts Convention provides that
"[tihe provisions of the Convention may be disregarded when their
be manifestly incompatible with public policy
application would
"
(ordrepublic). 83
The French expression is intended to show that the scope is
somewhat broader than the traditional English concept of public
policy. The official texts of all conventions drawn up by the
Hague Conference were in French only until 1960. Most of the
modem series of conventions, drawn up at the Seventh Plenary
Session in 1951 or thereafter, allowed for an exception to the

81.
Included in Hague Conference Information Document No. 2 of
September 1998, prepared by the Permanent Bureau entitled Preliminary Draft
Outline to Assist in the Preparation of a Convention on International Jurisdiction
and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commerical Matters at 18
(Article 12-Trusts) (on file with author). This document was sent by Jeffrey D.
Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law at the U.S.
Department of State, in a letter on September 14, 1998, to invited persons of the
third public meeting of the Study Group on Judgments, of the Secretary of State's
Advisory Committee on Private International Law, held October 2, 1998. The
fourth meeting of this Study Group was scheduled to be held on May 7, 1999 at
the U.S. Department of State.
82.
The Special Commission's fourth meeting was held at the Peace Palace
in June 1999. A changed and incomplete text on trusts was included as Article
12 of the Preliminary Draft Convention on jurisdiction and the effects of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, adopted provisionally by the Special
Commission on June 18, 1999. This document is available on the Hague
Conference's website at www.hcch.net under the heading "Work in Progress" and
the link "Jurisdiction and the Effects of Judgments."
Extract from the Final Act of the Fifteenth Session, supranote 75, art.
83.
18, at 364.
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4
application of the treaty's provisions for reasons of ordre public.8
The first Hague Convention to have an English version simply
referred therein to ordre public, without bringing in the English
expression "public policy."8 5 Beginning with the Hague Divorce
Convention, 8 6 the use of the expressions from both languages in
the English version whenever there was a reference to public
policy became standard drafting practice. In the two most recent
conventions drafted by the Hague Conference, the French
expression was dropped from the English versions and a
substantive gloss ("taking into account the best interests of the
child") was added to the reference, with an equivalent gloss in the
French version.8 7
This expression in the Hague Trusts
Convention is therefore at least as broad as the usage of the term
"public policy" by the Nebraska Supreme Court in First National
Bank v. Daggett.8 8 A court, whether in a civil law system or a
common law system, may apply Article 18 in order to apply its
public policy of always applying the law of the situs to questions
involving immovables. What it cannot do is refuse to accept the
idea that trusts form a sui generis category. 89
The first paragraph of Article 16 provides as follows: "The
Convention does not prevent the application of those provisions of
the law of the forum which must be applied even to international

situations, irrespective of rules of conflict of laws." 90

This provision has its source in European theories of the
conflict of laws pursuant to which certain types of legal rulesusually those which have an inherently territorial nature--escape
from any choice-of-law analysis and are simply applied directly.

84.
See, e.g., Convention sur la loi applicable aux ventes a caract~re
international d'objets mobiliers corporels du 15 juin 1955, art. 6, in CONF9RENCE
DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVII, DOCUMENTS RELATIFS A LA HUITIME
SESSION, 3 Au 24 OCTOBRE 1956, at 226.
85.
Convention on the Conflicts of Laws Relating to the Form of
Testamentary Dispositions, Oct. 5, 1961, art. 7, 510 U.N.T.S. 175, 179.
86.
Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, Jun.
1, 1970, art. 10, 978 U.N.T.S. 393, 401.
87.
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, art. 24, reprintedin, 32 I.L.M. 1134, 1142
(1993); Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and
Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the
Protection of Children, Oct. 19, 1996, art. 22, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1391, 1399
(1996).
88.
See supranotes 71-73 and accompanying text.
89.
Cf Georges A.L. Droz, Regards sur le droit internationalprivd compard,
229 Recueil des cours 13, 248 (1991); Adair Dyer, Introductory Note on the Hague
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on theirRecognition, 1 UNIFORM L.
REV. 274, 280 (1985).
90.
Extract from the Final Act of the Fifteenth Session, supranote 75, art.
16, at 365.
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They may be referred to as mandatory rules, or in some cases as
lois de police. While most North American theories of conflict of
laws would not employ such an analysis, this does not prevent
courts in the United States or Canada from applying the law of
the situs to issues concerning immovables as a mandatory rule of
a primary nature in its law. In fact, it would seem that the situs
rule in those jurisdictions that retain it in its purest form is not a
conflicts rule but rather a provision, in the words of Article 16,
"which must be applied even to international situations,
91
irrespective of rules of conflict of laws."
This approach would be reinforced by European principles of
jurisdiction in the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, which
assign exclusive jurisdiction over questions involving rights in
rem in immovable property to the courts of the situs of such
immovables. 9 2 The first paragraph of Article 16 of the Hague
Trusts Convention offers a more structured analysis for
application of the situs rule in jurisdictions that consider it to be
included among "provisions of the law of the forum which must
be applied even to international situations, irrespective of rules of
conflict of laws."9 3 It would not be necessary, then, to resort to
the more amorphous idea of public policy, 94 the use of which is
discouraged by the formulation of the relevant clause in the

Hague

Conventions.

The

restrictive

words

"manifestly

incompatible with public policy" are intended to discourage
frequent resort to this concept.

III.

EFFORTS TO ADOPT TRUST-LIKE DEVICES IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES

The principal countries in which consideration has been
given to the idea of adopting a trust-like device which would fit
within the definition set out in Article 2 of the Hague Trusts
Convention are France and the Netherlands. Even though the
idea was eventually abandoned in both jurisdictions, these efforts
are instructive because the process hindered the efforts to ratify
the Hague Trusts Convention in one, but not the other. In fact, it

91.
Id.
92.
See, e.g., Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, art. 16.1(a), 1988
O.J. (L 319) 9, 13. These grants of exclusive jurisdiction tend to confirm the
perception that the "forum" applying the first paragraph of Article 16 of the Hague
Trusts Convention, as well as the forum applying its public policy under Article
18, will be, where rights in rem to immovables are concerned, the competent court

of the place where the immovables are situated.
93.
See supranotes 90-91.
94.
See Explanatory Report by Alfred E. von Overbeck, supranote 1, at 404
(no. 150).
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had been clear from the beginning that the Convention's purpose
was not to introduce the trust into the civil law countries but
rather to furnish judges and practitioners with the elements that
would allow them to understand this legal institution more
clearly. 95
A. The FrenchProposalto Adopt Legislation on the Fiducie
A fiduciary practice known as the fiducie had existed long
before the adoption of the Civil Code (1804), but the practice had
fallen into disuse. 9 6 The Hague Trusts Convention was signed by
France on November 26, 1991. 97
The prospect of French
ratification of this treaty led business lawyers in France to favor
not simply the recognition of foreign trusts, but also the creation
of a French legal institution that could offer the same
advantages. 98 This resulted in a proposal by the Ministry of
Justice in Paris looking to the adoption of a new law.99
This proposal was in the end abandoned due to opposition
from the French fiscal authorities, 0 0 and the proposal to ratify
the Hague Convention has languished since then. This is
unfortunate, since the lack of a trust-like device in a country's
domestic law is an additional reason for joining a treaty which
creates a category for dealing with trusts created under a foreign
law.

Some doubt was expressed as to whether the draft law would
have authorized the creation of trusts within the meaning of the
Hague Convention's definition (Article 2), especially since the
fiducie was characterized therein (Article 2062) as a contract.
Because the draft legislation has been withdrawn, I will not
undertake a detailed analysis of its provisions. However, for the
record, I wish to state my conclusion, reached after discussions
with a very well-informed doubter, that the contract in question

95.
See Mariel Revillard, La Convention de La Haye du ler juilet 1985,
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE. ET PRATIQUE NOTARIALE (R6pertoire du notariat Defrenois
1986), 691, art. 33731.
96.
See Dyer & van Loon, supra note 33, at 37 n.62; cf. Bdraudo, supra
note 13, at 28-32, see generally, Michel Grimaldi, La fiducie: rdflexions sur
l'institution et sur l'avant-projet de loi qui la consacre, REPERTOIRE DU NOTARIAT
DEFRENOIS, 15 septembre 1991, 1 re partie, art. 35085 et la suite, art. 35094.
97.
See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention of 1
July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition (last updated
Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.hcch.net/e/status/stat30e.html>.
98.
See Bdraudo, supra note 13, at 1-2 n. 64.
99,
Text (in French only) published as an annex to the article by Michel
Grimaldi, supra note 96, art. 35094 at 992-96. See also Rdmy, in PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN TRUST LAW, supranote 44, at 131, 143-47.

100.

See Waters, supranote 20, at 391-96.
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would not have been a trust, but the relationships created would
have been entitled to recognition under the Hague Convention.
B. The Dutch Considerationson an Adaptation of the Bewind
In the Netherlands, during the preparatory work undertaken
with a vew to ratification of the Hague Convention, thought was
given to adapting the well-known fiduciary institution called the
bewind so that it would qualify as a trust under the Convention's
definition. 10 1 This article has already discussed some of the
difficulties posed by the definition of "ownership" set out in
Article 1 of Title 1, Book 5, of the New Netherlands Civil Code, as
well as by the restrictions on the transfer of assets set out in
Article 84 of Book 3 thereof. 10 2 It seems that the problems
associated with inserting a trust-like institution into the system
of the Civil Code, rather than tax considerations as such, brought
about the abandonment of the idea of adapting a Dutch legal
configuration. Professor Koppenol-Laforce has expressed the
03
opinion that the possibilities for doing this should be revisited.'
C. The Fideicomiso-Trustin Panama
The Panamanian trust is governed by Law No. 1 of January
5, 1984.104 This act substantially modified Law 17 of 1941,
which itself had taken the place of Law 9 of 1925. The
introduction of an English-style trust had been favored by the
eminent Panamanian jurist, Ricardo J. Alfaro, in remarks
published in 1925.105 The 1984 law defined the fldeicomiso as an
unilateral act, eliminating the mandate (mandato) concept that
had existed before then in Law 17 of 1941.106
The characteristics of the Panamanian trust are described by
Professor Boutin in his article The Conflict of Laws and Trusts in
Panama,published in Trusts & Trustees.10 7 In the same article,
Professor Boutin states, "A comparative chart between The Hague

101. See generally Waters, supra note 20, at 388-391 (assuming a bond with
one person and not successive generations).
102.
Cf. M.E. KOPPENOL-LAFORCE, HET HAAGSE TRUSTVERDRAG (The Hague
Trusts Convention), supranote 62, at 270-72 (English summary).
103.
See id. at 277.
104. The text of this law (in Spanish) is reprinted in GIBLERTO BOUTIN I., EL
FIDEICOMISO PANAMEIO EN EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO Y L CONVENCION DE LA
HAYA (1985) RELATIVA A LA LEY APLICABLE AL TRUST Y A Su RECONOCIMIENTO (Editores
Asociados, Tradinco S.A. Montevideo, Uruguay 1990).
105.
See id. at 19.
106.
See id. at 20.
107.
See <http://www.trusts-and-trustees.com/library/boutin-06-9601.htm1>.
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Professor Boutin states, "A comparative chart between The Hague
of Panama,
Convention, 1985, and the Law 1, January 5, 01984
8
would show that there are no incompatibilities."
D. The Trust (Shintaku) in Japan
The Hague Trusts Convention has stimulated considerable
scrutiny in Japan, where a form of trust, called shintaku, was
introduced in 1922 into what was essentially a civil law system.
The initial report entitled Report on Trusts and Analogous
Institutions, by Adair Dyer and Hans van Loon, was translated
into Japanese and published in the trusts periodical Shintaku.109
A Japanese translation of Professor von Overbeck's Explanatory
Report and the text of the Convention were subsequently
published in the same periodical. 110 Significant collections of
articles have subsequently been published in Japanese."'
Though the ratification of the Hague Convention by Japan
does not seem to be imminent, the continuing interest shown
there in the Hague Trusts Convention, as well as in the domestic
institution, may presage an effort to reconcile the Convention and
shintaku at some time in the future.
E. China
When the People's Republic of China resumed the exercise of
sovereignty in what is now known as the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (SAR), it formally confirmed the
continuation in force in the SAR of numerous treaties that were
then in force-including the Hague Trusts Convention. 1 12 China
is considering the possibility of adopting trust legislation that
would be applicable on the mainland." x3

108.
Id. at 4-5 (copy on file with the author).
109.
Report on Trusts and Analogous Institutions, supranote 36, translated
and reprintedin 142 SHINTAKU 45 (1985).
110.
Explanatory Report of Alfred E. von Overbeck, supra note 1, translated
and reprintedin 153 SHINTAKU 44 (1988).
111.
See generally SHINTAKU-HO KEN'KYU (Study of Law of Trust), at 3, 5, 31,
65, 97, 110 (S. Ikehara ed. 1990).
112.
See The Position of the People's Republic of China and the United
Kingdom on Multilateral Treaties Applying to the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, 36 I.L.M 1675, 1676, 1680-81, 1684 (1997) (communications on June 20,
1997 submitted to the United Nations by the Permanent Representatives of these

two countries).
113. See Adair Dyer, InternationalRecognition of the Trust Concept, 3 TRUSTS
& TRUSTEES 24 (June 1997).
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IV. POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON TAXATION OF TRUSTS IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES

When the Hague Trusts Convention was first signed by Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, I already had the following to
say:
Care was taken to assure the tax authorities of the various States
that they would not in any way be bound by the provisions of this

Convention, which are directed to the effects of trusts in civil law
but not in public law. Article 19 Provides: 'Nothing in the
Convention shall prejudice the powers of States in fiscal matters."
It is to be hoped, however, that the effort towards analysis of the

trust device and its relationships which has been involved in the
preparation of the Hague Convention will be of some assistance to
the fiscal authorities of States which do not have trusts in their
own law, in determining appropriate ways to approach trust
1 14
interests for tax purposes.

Only two continental European countries with civil law systems
have ratified the Convention so far: Italy and the Netherlands.
In the Netherlands, according to Jan H.W. Schipper, the
Under-Secretary of Finance "informed the tax authorities, in a
public notification, of the manner in which they must approach
the legal entity [sic] of a trust."1 1 5
The Ministry's body
responsible for dealing with activities concerning trusts is called
Co-ordination Group to Combat Fiscal Structures." 6 A specific
task force set up within the Inland Revenue, called the Mortmain
Property Task Force, has the authority to make advance rulings
l 7
under certain conditions."
It seems clear that the increase in the number of trusts
having some connection with the Netherlands-as well as the
creation of a category for them in Dutch civil law by the
ratification of the Hague Trusts Convention-are stimulating an
effort at analysis on the part of the Netherlands' fiscal authorities
and courts, including four recent decisions by the Third Chamber
of the Netherlands' Supreme Court."18
Case No. 31.756119 involved irrevocable discretionary trusts
set up by a person living in the Netherlands with the Rabobank
Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd., under a trust instrument executed

114.
115.

Dyer, Introductory Note, supranote 43, at 281.
Jan H.W. Schipper, Some Dutch Fiscal Aspects Regarding Trusts, 3

21 (May 1997). This notification by dating the UnderSecretary of Finance was made public in a decision dated June 22, 1995. See id.
at 22.
116.
See id.
117.
See id.
118.
[Plaintiff/Defendant], HR 18 Nov. 1998, 31.756, 31.757, 31.758,
31.759.
119. A copy of this decision (in Dutch), rendered November 18, 1998 is on
file with the author.
TRUSTS & TRUSTEES
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Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd., under a trust instrument executed
in London and designating Jersey law as applicable. A protector
(who was, initially, the father of the settlor) had powers that
included the right to designate additional persons as
beneficiaries, as well as to remove the trustees. The trustees had
the power to make distributions to the various beneficiaries as
they decided. The Supreme Court, overturning the decision of the
lower court in The Hague, found that the trusts were to be viewed
as being valid under the Hague Trusts Convention, and that
Article 13 was not to be utilized so as to avoid recognition of
them. Article 19 preserved the powers of the Netherlands' tax

authorities. The Court applied the trust law as determined by the
lower court in order to determine the effects of the trust under
applicable law and then characterized these effects in terms of
the Dutch tax laws.12 0 It found that the settlor had irrevocably
transferred the property to the trustee, thus that a taxable gift of
the property by a person living in the Netherlands had been made
under the view of the Netherlands' tax law, but the named
beneficiaries had no vested right which could cause them to be
taxed as recipients of the gift. It found that Netherlands law had
a concept of property dedicated to a specific purpose
(doelvermogen), which was not considered as belonging to anyone
and thus was dealt with as an independent legal entity, and the
trusts in question fell within this category. Thus, it concluded
that the amounts transferred were subject to gift tax at the rate
charged for gifts to non-relatives and that the trustee was
responsible for payment of the tax. The State Secretary of
Finance lost the appeal, and the assessments levied against the
beneficiaries were annulled.
I am no expert in the taxation of trusts and thus cannot
express an opinion as to the soundness of the "dedicated
property" concept that the Netherlands Supreme Court has used
in this case. On its face, this approach seems to be faithful to the
idea of a separate trust fund. Whether this concept can be
employed to bring about sound results, both from a civil law
perspective and from that of taxation, in other contexts remains
to be seen. Tentatively, it seems that the modest hope that this
author expressed in 1985121 is being reflected in the practice,

and that the courts are also participating in this effort.

120. This was an approach that had been recommended by Hans van Loon
in a preadvies (report) that he delivered before the Netherlands Branch of the
International Law Association in June 1983. See A. DYER & J.H.A. VAN LOON,
ANGLO-AMERIKAANSE TRUSTS EN HET NEDERLANDSE RECHT 92 (Deventer, 1983).

121,

See Dyer, Introductory Note, supranote 43, at 281.
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V. CONCLUSION

The process of bringing English-style trusts into systems that
do not have a similar device is fraught with difficulties. This is
especially true with respect to efforts directed towards the
creation of a domestic trust law within such a system, but it is
also true about the adaptation of legal institutions that is
necessary in order to recognize trusts created under foreign law,
in accordance with Article 11 of the Hague Trusts Convention.
Thus far, it can be said that no country that did not have trusts
before the Hague Trusts Convention has reacted to the
Convention by adopting a brand new domestic form of trust.
Panama and Japan had already introduced trusts into domestic
law in the 1920s-as had Mexico and Liechtenstein-while the
Venezuelan trust law dates from the 1950s.
In France, the
failure of the proposal to create a domestic form of trust had the

unfortunate effect of setting back the ratification of the Hague
Convention. This, in turn, may have slowed the process in the
United States and certain provinces of Canada, where the
perceptions as to certain problems of implementation might have
been outweighed by the advantages if more large civil law
countries had ratified in the early, break-in period.
The trust, however, has been around a long time, and its
evolution to the present state of practice has required centuries of
thought and analysis. It has been seen as the most characteristic
contribution of the English-language legal systems to law around
the world. It has been described by Professor J. Limpens as "a
synthesis of the law of fiduciary relationships," comparable to
Rome's synthesis of the law of contract and France's synthesis of
tort law. 122 Professor Limpens went on to say, "It must be
believed that a fundamental synthesis requires such an amount
of cleverness and tenacity that one civilisation can hardly realise
23
more than one at the same time."'
In this context, the publication of the Principlesof European
Trust Law'2 4 is a signal event. One can say that a fundamental
synthesis will always find its response, and the response reflected
in these Principles is a most impressive concurrence of thinking
among leading experts.
The fifteen-year anniversary of the adoption of the Hague
Trusts Convention's text (three lustra in the Dutch count) in
October 1999 represents a very short period in the life of the

122. J. Limpens, Foreword to CHRISTIAN DE WULF, THE TRUST AND
CORRESPONDING INSTITUTIONS INTHE CIVIL LAW 8, 10 (Brussels Establishments 8mile
Braylant 1965).

123.

Id.

124.

See supranote 44.
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English trust as a legal institution. It is too soon to say whether
the synthesis of the law of fiduciary relationships achieved
through centuries of English practice will in the long run be
found to be adaptable to, and needed in, a wide range of civil law
systems. The steps taken in Italy and the Netherlands of ratifying
and implementing the Hague Trusts Convention show a
remarkable willingness of non-trust countries to accept and
understand foreign trusts.
They form two rather different
laboratories for testing the feasibility of giving transnational effect
to the intentions of settlors.
The United Kingdom, seven
Canadian provinces, Australia, and a number of offshore
jurisdictions-including Hong Kong SAR, Jersey and Malta-are
joined in this effort. It would be helpful if more common law and
civil law jurisdictions would ratify or accede to the Hague Trusts
Convention, which remains the centerpiece of the move towards
mutual understanding in the field of fiduciary law.

TOPIC VI
Money-Laundering and Ethical
Considerations for the Lawyer and Trust
Officer in Dealing with
the International Trust
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